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OPINION 
                                              
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Frederick Capps challenges the District Court’s Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Capps’ former 
employer, Mondelez Global, LLC (“Mondelez”), one of the 
largest manufacturers of snack food and beverage productions 
in the United States.  Specifically, Capps argues that the 
District Court erred in granting Mondelez’s summary 
judgment motion on Capps’ claims that Mondelez: (1) 
interfered with his rights under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; (2) acted in 
retaliation to Capps’ proper use of FMLA leave; and (3) 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended 
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.   
 
 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the District 
Court’s Order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Mondelez.  In so doing, we hold that an employer’s honest 
belief that its employee was misusing FMLA leave can defeat 
an FMLA retaliation claim.  We also confirm that, under 
certain circumstances, a request for intermittent FMLA leave 
may also constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA, but under the circumstances in this particular 
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case, even assuming, arguendo, such a request was made, 
there is a lack of evidence that Mondelez failed to provide 
any requested accommodation.   
 
I.    BACKGROUND 
 
 Mondelez’s predecessor, Nabisco, hired Capps in 
November 1989.  At all relevant times to this action, Capps 
held the position of mixer, which required him to operate a 
mixing machine that makes dough.   
 
 Mondelez has maintained a policy that an employee is 
entitled to FMLA leave for a “serious health condition of the 
employee that makes the employee unable to perform one or 
more of the essential functions of his/her position.”  (JA 451.)  
An employee may use intermittent FMLA leave when it is a 
“medical necessity,” and the employee must provide notice of 
the leave “as soon as practicable.”  (JA 451-52.)   
 
 Any employee who wishes to take FMLA leave due to 
his own serious health condition must provide the company 
with a certification from his health care provider.  Company 
policy also provides: “As with all communications with the 
Company, the submission of false information to the 
Company regarding the need for FMLA leave, or the 
fraudulent use of FMLA leave, may result in discipline, up to 
and including termination.”  (JA 452.)    
 
 Mondelez also has a policy entitled “Dishonest Acts 
on the Part of Employees” (“Dishonest Acts Policy”), which 
is considered a “Major Rule.”  (JA 449, 457.)  Violations of 
“Major Rules” are considered inexcusable offenses that “will 
result in immediate suspension pending investigation, which 
could lead to termination.”  (JA 449, 457.)  Mondelez’s 
Dishonest Acts Policy includes the warning that “THE 
COMPANY WILL NOT TOLERATE DISHONESTY 
ON THE PART OF ITS EMPLOYEES, WHETHER IT 
BE COMMITTED AGAINST THE COMPANY, 
ANOTHER EMPLOYEE, ITS CUSTOMERS, OR 
OTHERS EITHER DURING OR AFTER WORKING 
HOURS” and that “ANY EMPLOYEE FOUND GUILTY 
OF A DISHONEST ACT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO 
DISMISSAL.”  (JA 449 (emphasis in original).)     
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 Capps suffers with Avascular Necrosis (“AVN”), 
which was described by Aron Guttin, D.O., Capps’ treating 
physician, as “a condition in which there is a loss of blood 
flow, severely limiting oxygen and nutrient delivery to the 
bone and tissues, essentially suffocating and causing death of 
those cells.”  (JA 312.)  As a result of the AVN, Capps 
developed arthritis in both hips which necessitated bilateral 
hip replacement in or about 2003.    
 
 He has experienced severe pain at times in the pelvic 
region, thighs and hips, sometimes lasting for days or weeks 
at a time.  Therefore, he requested intermittent time off from 
work when flare-ups occurred.  Capps was certified for 
intermittent FMLA leave following his hip replacements, and 
thereafter throughout his tenure at Mondelez, he was 
continuously recertified approximately every six months for 
intermittent FMLA leave for his condition until his 
employment was terminated in 2014.   
 
 The certification supporting Capps’ approved FMLA 
leave covering January 24, 2013 through July 23, 2013 was 
completed by Dr. Guttin who certified that Capps was unable 
to perform certain job functions as a result of his condition.  
Where the certification form required Dr. Guttin to “identify 
the job functions the employee is unable to perform,” Dr. 
Guttin responded that Capps “requires full bedrest during 
exacerbations.”  (JA 334.)   
 
 Dr. Guttin further stated that “[t]his year [the episodes] 
have been more severe [and] more frequent than years prior” 
and that Capps “experiences temporary periods of 
inflammation that are debilitating and require anti-
inflammatory medication and rest.”  (JA 334, 335.)  
Mondelez’s third-party FMLA administrator, WorkCare, 
approved this request under the FMLA, and the approval 
noted that Capps “may need to be off work 1-2 times every 
month for a duration of up to 14 days per episode for 
incapacity and treatment appointments.”  (JA 342.) 
 
 On Monday, February 11 and Tuesday, February 12, 
2013, Capps took FMLA leave due to leg pain, and he 
returned to work for a full shift on Wednesday, February 13, 
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2013.  Capps was scheduled to work on Thursday, February 
14, 2013, but he called Mondelez’s phone system and the 
FMLA message line on February 14th stating he would be late 
to work because of leg pain.  Later that day, he again called 
the FMLA message line and Mondelez’s phone system 
stating that he would be taking a full day of FMLA leave 
since the pain had not subsided.  Dr. Guttin also signed 
Capps’ FMLA certification form dated February 14th.       
 
 Capps testified at his deposition that his wife was out 
of the country that week on a business trip and that because 
he didn’t “know how to cook,” he had to “call out or go out” 
for his meals.  (JA 279.)  Capps further testified that at 
approximately 6:30 p.m. on the 14th he drove to a local pub, 
which was not more than one and a half miles from his home, 
to “get something to eat” (JA 279).  According to Capps, at 
the pub he also drank three beers and three shots of alcohol 
with his friends, and he spent approximately two and a half (2 
½) to three hours at the pub.  Afterwards, despite feeling too 
intoxicated to drive, Capps attempted to drive home.  
 
 Capps testified that after leaving the pub, at or around 
9:00 p.m. he was stopped by police.  The Bensalem Township 
police drove Capps to the hospital for a blood test, which 
resulted in a reading of a blood alcohol concentration level of 
0.339% - more than four times the legal limit in 
Pennsylvania.  Capps testified that he was released from jail 
early the next morning on Friday, February 15, 2013.  He 
further testified that he woke up on the 15th “probably about 
10, 11 o’clock” and his “legs were bothering [him] again.”  
(JA 46.)  He stated that he “just hung around the house, just 
wasn’t feeling good” and “took some Aleve again.”  (JA 46.)   
 
  Capps was scheduled to begin his shift that Friday 
afternoon at 1 p.m. on February 15th.  However, on the 15th, 
he called Mondelez’s phone system and the FMLA message 
line indicating that he would be using FMLA leave due to leg 
pain.   
 
 Capps returned to work on Monday, February 18, 
2013.  Upon returning to work, he performed the same work 
and received the same salary and benefits as before taking 
FMLA leave.  He did not report his arrest to anyone at 
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Mondelez; nor was he required to under Mondelez’s policies.  
Upon recertification, Capps was approved for FMLA leave 
from July 31, 2013 through January 30, 2014.    
 
 On August 7, 2013, Capps pled guilty to the charge of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”), and he 
served 72 hours in jail immediately following the guilty plea 
hearing.  His sentence also included probation, costs and 
fines, and suspension of his driver’s license.   
 
 In early 2014, William Oxenford, a Human Resources 
(“HR”) Manager at Mondelez, became aware of Capps’ DUI 
conviction and sentence by finding in Oxenford’s company 
mailbox a newspaper article reporting the same.  Oxenford 
asked Barbara McAvoy, an employee in the HR department, 
and Nancy Pace, administrative assistant to the plant 
manager, to investigate Capps’ attendance record to 
determine if Capps had any absences during the time frame of 
Capps’ arrest and conviction.    
 
 Although neither Oxenford nor McAvoy were 
attorneys, and they did not understand the meaning of all the 
docket entries, upon reviewing the criminal court docket 
related to Capps’ conviction, Oxenford and McAvoy noticed 
that Capps’ arrest date and “court dates” appeared to coincide 
with days on which Capps had taken FMLA leave.  For 
instance, Capps’ arrest date, February 14, 2013, was a day on 
which Capps had called out on FMLA leave.  He also called 
out on FMLA leave the next day.  In addition, he called out of 
work using FMLA leave on other dates that appeared on the 
court docket: June 4, 2013 (“Appearance and Waiver of 
Arraignment”) and October 15, 2013 (“ARD Court”).   
 
 Oxenford and McAvoy confronted Capps and his 
union representative with this information at a meeting on 
February 26, 2014.  In response, Capps promised to provide 
documentation to support his FMLA leave on the days in 
question, and Capps was suspended pending further 
investigation.   
 
 Upon being suspended, Capps submitted to Mondelez 
an undated letter from Dr. Guttin confirming the 
aforementioned dates Capps had taken FMLA leave during 
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the week of February 11, 2013 due to his “hip pathology” (JA 
407).  The undated letter further stated that Capps had taken 
FMLA leave on June 3 and 4, 2013 due to his hip pathology, 
and also that he had a court date on June 7, 2013 but “waived 
his right for that appearance.”  (JA 407.)  Oxenford was 
suspicious of the undated letter which included legal 
information from Dr. Guttin regarding scheduled court dates 
and certain legal rights that Capps had waived.  Mondelez 
subsequently received a nearly identical letter dated February 
27, 2014 from Dr. Guttin.    
 
 Capps also submitted to Mondelez an unsigned first 
page only of a letter dated May 31, 2013 addressed to Capps 
from his attorney in the DUI matter confirming some of the 
dates related to his DUI action.  On April 21, 2014, nearly 
two months after he was suspended and promised to provide 
documentation (and one month after receiving notice of his 
termination), Capps provided a complete copy of that 2-page 
letter.  After Capps had been terminated, he presented a 
second letter from his DUI attorney dated March 26, 2014 
confirming that Capps attended court proceedings on May 9, 
2013 and August 7, 2013 and that Capps was incarcerated 
from August 7, 2013 to August 10, 2013.     
 
 Capps was notified of his termination of employment 
by letter dated March 21, 2014, effective February 26, 2014.  
That decision was made by Oxenford and the plant manager, 
Rusty Moore, in conjunction with Mondelez’s legal 
department.  The letter confirmed that Capps’ termination 
was based on his violation of the Dishonest Acts Policy.  The 
termination letter further stated: “You claimed to be out due 
to [ ] FMLA related issues on multiple dates.  The 
documentation you produced does not support your claim of  
[ ] FMLA related absences.”  (JA 404.)   
 
 Following Capps’ termination, Mondelez retained the 
services of an investigator. The investigator reported on April 
25, 2014 that a detective from the police department indicated 
that Capps had been released from custody from his DUI 
arrest at 6:00 a.m. on the morning following the arrest.   
 
 Capps completed a Grievance Form on March 27, 
2014 claiming he was “unlawfully terminated.”  (JA 405.)  
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Mondelez offered Capps reinstatement without back pay on 
April 28, 2014, and Capps rejected the offer of reinstatement 
on May 13, 2014.     
 
 Capps initiated this lawsuit on July 18, 2014.  He filed 
his Second Amended Complaint on October 16, 2014 alleging 
claims of interference and retaliation in violation of the 
FMLA, violations of the ADA, and violations of the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).1  Following 
discovery, Mondelez filed a motion for summary judgment on 
July 27, 2015, and on that same date Capps filed a cross-
motion for partial summary judgment on his FMLA 
interference claim.   
 
 By Memorandum and Order filed November 24, 2015, 
the District Court granted Mondelez’s summary judgment 
motion and denied Capps’ cross-motion. See Capps v. 
Mondelez Global LLC, 147 F. Supp.3d 327, 330 (E.D. Pa. 
2015).  The District Court granted summary judgment on 
Capps’ FMLA interference claim due to Capps’ inability to 
show that he was denied a benefit to which he was entitled 
under the FMLA.  Id. at 335.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment on Capps’ FMLA retaliation claim 
because the record evidence showed that Mondelez based its 
decision to terminate Capps’ employment on an honest belief 
that Capps misused that leave.2  Id. at 330, 339-40.  Finally, 
                                              
1 Because the PHRA is coextensive with the applicable 
federal law, the conclusions herein are equally applicable to 
Capps’ claims under the PHRA.  See, e.g., Kelly v. Drexel 
Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that “courts . . 
. generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal 
counterparts”). 
 
2 In support of its holding that Mondelez’s honest belief 
defeated Capps’ FMLA claim, the District Court cited two 
non-precedential opinions, Warwas v. City of Plainfield, 489 
F. App’x 585, 588 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Crouch v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 447 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2006)) (“[A]n employer 
may defeat an FMLA claim if the discharge was based upon 
the employer’s honest belief that the plaintiff either misused 
or failed to use her medical leave for the intended purpose.”), 
and Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 309 F. App’x 551, 563 (3d 
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the District Court granted summary judgment on Capps’ 
ADA claim because, although Capps requested and received 
intermittent leave under the FMLA, he never made a request 
for an accommodation under the ADA.  Id. at 340.  
 
II.    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
 
 Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 
859 (3d Cir. 2014).  A moving party is entitled to summary 
judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute about a material fact is 
“genuine” only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  All reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.  
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 
2009).         
 
III.    FMLA  CLAIMS 
 The FMLA provides, in relevant part, that “eligible 
employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 
12-month period due to an employee’s own serious health 
condition.”  Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)).  Under the FMLA, when an 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2009) (finding no FMLA violation where termination of 
employment was due to employer’s honest belief that 
employee misrepresented his health condition in violation of 
the employer’s Business Code of Conduct).  Both Parker and 
Warwas rely on Seventh Circuit case law in support of 
application of the honest belief defense.  See, e.g., Crouch, 
447 F.3d at 986 (“[A]n employer’s honest suspicion that the 
employee was not using his medical leave for its intended 
purpose is enough to defeat the employee’s substantive rights 
FMLA claim.”).      
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employee returns from such leave, the employer must restore 
the employee to the same or equivalent position held by the 
employee when the leave commenced, as well as restore the 
employee with equivalent benefits and conditions of 
employment.  Id. (citing § 2614(a)).   
 
 We have previously explained: 
[W]hen employees invoke rights 
granted under the FMLA, 
employers may not “interfere 
with, restrain, or deny the exercise 
of or attempt to exercise” these 
rights.3 Nor may employers 
“discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any 
individual for opposing any 
practice made unlawful.”4   
 
Id. (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 
F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted)) (footnotes 
added).  In addition, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) prohibits 
employers “from discriminating or retaliating against an 
employee or prospective employee for having exercised or 
attempted to exercise FMLA rights.”  Here, Capps has alleged 
claims of FMLA interference and retaliation.    
 
  (A)  FMLA Retaliation Claim 
 Capps claims that Mondelez discriminated against him 
in violation of the FMLA by terminating his employment in 
retaliation for his use of FMLA leave.  Since “FMLA 
retaliation claims require proof of the employer’s retaliatory 
intent, courts have assessed these claims through the lens of 
employment discrimination law.”  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 
302.  Accordingly, a claim such as Capps’ FMLA retaliation 
claim is assessed under the burden-shifting framework 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
                                              
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).   
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). 
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792 (1973).5  See Ross, 755 F.3d at 193 (citing Lichtenstein, 
691 F.3d at 302).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
 
a plaintiff must first establish a 
prima facie case of 
discrimination.  If the plaintiff 
succeeds, the defendant must 
articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action.  The 
burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, 
that the articulated reason was a 
mere pretext for discrimination. 
 
                                              
5 Capps briefly asserts in conclusory fashion that this case 
should be analyzed under the framework set forth in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII 
mixed-motive gender discrimination case).  In particular, 
Capps’ appellate brief includes a paragraph stating generally 
that the mixed-motive framework set forth in Price 
Waterhouse applies “when a plaintiff alleging unlawful 
termination presents direct evidence” of discrimination, see 
Appellant Br. 25 (emphasis omitted).  Even assuming there is 
a direct evidence requirement after Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), other than stating this general 
proposition, Capps fails to explain how the Price Waterhouse 
framework applies to the specific circumstances in this case.  
In any event, to the extent that Capps is arguing that this case 
should be analyzed under the Price Waterhouse framework, 
as opposed to the McDonnell Douglas framework, based on 
allegedly direct evidence of discrimination, the record is 
bereft of evidence of discriminatory intent, much less 
evidence that “is so revealing of retaliatory animus that it is 
unnecessary to rely on the McDonnell Douglas . . . burden-
shifting framework,” see Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
126 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 
302 (“leav[ing] for another day our resolution of whether the 
FMLA continues to allow mixed-motive claims in the wake 
of Gross [v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)].”).       
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Ross, 755 F.3d at 193 (citations omitted).   
 Here, the District Court found that, “when viewing the 
facts in a light most favorable to Capps, he is unable to 
sustain an FMLA retaliation claim.”  See Capps, 147 F. 
Supp.3d at 336.  First, the District Court found that Capps 
cannot establish a prima facie case because “[h]e cannot 
demonstrate that the proper use of his FMLA leave – a 
protected activity – is causally connected to his termination.”6  
Id.  The Court further found that “[e]ven if Capps could 
establish a prima facie case, he has not adduced any 
meaningful evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder 
to find pretext.”  Id.    
 
 As the District Court found, even assuming, arguendo, 
that Capps could establish a prima facie case of FMLA 
retaliation, Mondelez met its burden of demonstrating a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for Capps’ 
discharge with evidence that Capps was terminated for his 
misuse of FMLA leave and dishonesty surrounding the leave 
in violation of Mondelez’s policies.  See McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 
1994).  “FMLA retaliation claims require proof of the 
employer’s retaliatory intent.”  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302 
(emphasis added).  Where an employer provides evidence that 
the reason for the adverse employment action taken by the 
                                              
6 To succeed on an FMLA retaliation claim, Capps must show 
that (1) he invoked his right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) he 
suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse 
action was causally related to his invocation of rights.  See 
Ross, 755 F.3d at 193 (citing Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302).  
In support of the finding of a lack of evidence demonstrating 
the required causal connection, the District Court pointed to 
the absence of an unusually suggestive temporal proximity 
between the protected activity and the termination, as well as 
the lack of evidence supporting a finding of a pattern of 
antagonism towards Capps for taking FMLA leave.  See 
Capps, 147 F. Supp.3d at 336-37; see also Abramson v. 
William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“[O]ur case law has focused on two main factors in 
finding the causal link necessary for retaliation: timing and 
evidence of ongoing antagonism.”).    
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employer was an honest belief that the employee was 
misusing FMLA leave, that is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
justification for the discharge.  See, e.g., Kariotis v. Navistar 
Int’l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 
845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992)) (holding, where the employer 
provided evidence that it fired the employee because of an 
honest belief that the employee committed disability fraud, 
that “arguing about the accuracy of the employer’s 
assessment is a distraction because the question is not 
whether the employer’s reasons for a decision are ‘right but 
whether the employer’s description of its reasons is honest’”) 
(citation omitted).    
 
 In Scruggs v. Carrier Corp., 688 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 
2012), where the evidence demonstrated that the employer 
held an honest suspicion that the employee was misusing his 
FMLA leave at the time it made the decision to terminate the 
employee, the Seventh Circuit found that the evidence could 
not support a conclusion that the employer intentionally 
discriminated against the employee for taking FMLA leave.  
Id. at 827.  In affirming the District Court’s Order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Seventh 
Circuit in Scruggs pointed out that the employee requested 
and was granted leave, took his approved leave, and returned 
to work the following day, and it was not until after the 
employer had received evidence of misconduct that the 
employee was terminated.  Id.; see also Arrigo v. Link, 836 
F.3d 787, 796 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he question is not whether 
[the employer] was correct to believe that [the employee] 
performed poorly, but rather whether he honestly believed 
that she did.”).   
 
 Similarly, in Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, 
Inc., 691 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2012), the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
the District Court’s Order granting summary judgment in 
favor of an employer on an employee’s FMLA discrimination 
claim on the basis of evidence of the employer’s honest belief 
that the employee violated company policy and the lack of 
evidence showing that the employer’s explanation was 
pretextual.  Id. at 1007.  The Eighth Circuit pointed out that 
this honest belief was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the action and that “[t]o prove that the employer’s 
14 
 
explanation was false, the employee must show the employer 
did not truly believe that the employee violated company 
rules.”  Id. at 1003.  In explaining the so-called “honest belief 
rule,” the appellate court in Pulczinski stated that the “critical 
inquiry in discrimination cases like this one is not whether the 
employee actually engaged in the conduct for which he was 
terminated, but whether the employer in good faith believed 
that the employee was guilty of the conduct justifying 
discharge.”  Id. at 1002.  The Eighth Circuit further 
explained: “[The employee] must present sufficient evidence 
that the employer acted with an intent to discriminate, not 
merely that the reason stated by the employer was incorrect.  
Taken alone, that the employer’s belief turns out to be wrong 
is not enough to prove discrimination.”7  Id. at 1003. 
 
 In Medley v. Polk Co., 260 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2001), 
an employee claimed that her employer fired her for taking 
FMLA leave.  In addressing an issue of first impression, id. at 
1204, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge erred in 
failing to give a requested “Honest Belief Defense Charge” to 
the jury, since an employer’s honest, albeit possibly mistaken, 
belief that an employee had committed fraud, defeats an 
employee’s FMLA retaliation claim, id. at 1207-08.  In 
support of its holding, the Tenth Circuit pointed to the 
                                              
7 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a modified version of the 
honest belief rule requiring employers to show that the 
employer’s nondiscriminatory reason not only is honest but 
also is “reasonably based on particularized facts.”  See Smith 
v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998); see also 
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 
2006).  We join the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in explicitly 
declining to follow that modified approach to the honest 
belief rule.  See Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1003; Little v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012 n.3 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Flores v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 182 F.3d 512, 516 (7th 
Cir. 1999)).  “Where the employment action is grounded in an 
honest and permissible reason, there can be no intent to 
discriminate unlawfully - even if that reason is not reasonably 
based on particularized facts.”  Id.; see Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 
1003 (rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s modified version of the 
honest belief rule as inconsistent with the statute). 
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Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Kariotis:8 “Discrimination 
statutes allow employers to discharge employees for almost 
any reason whatsoever (even a mistaken but honest belief) as 
long as the reason is not illegal discrimination.  Thus when an 
employee is discharged because of an employer’s honest 
mistake, federal anti-discrimination laws offer no protection.”  
Id. at 1208 (quoting Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 680).9   
 Here, as described above, Mondelez provided evidence 
clearly supporting its legitimate, non-discriminatory 
                                              
8 Kariotis, which the Tenth Circuit has described as the 
“germinal case applying [the honest belief] principle in an 
FMLA setting,” see Medley, 260 F.3d at 1208, affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims 
alleging that employment termination violated the ADA, Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), and the FMLA.  
The Seventh Circuit held that the employer’s honest belief 
that the employee had fraudulently accepted disability 
benefits following knee surgery defeated the aforementioned 
claims, whether or not the employer was mistaken in 
concluding that the employee actually had committed fraud.  
Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 674.   
 
9 The authorities applying the “honest belief” rule are 
consistent with our precedent in comparable contexts.  See 
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (quoting McCoy v. WGN Continental Broad. Co., 
957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)) (noting, in the context of 
an ADEA case, that we “do not sit as a super-personnel 
department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions . . . 
[O]ur inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an 
honest explanation of its behavior”); see also Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 765 (holding, in a Title VII case, that a plaintiff 
cannot discredit an employer’s proffered legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for termination by “simply show[ing] 
that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the 
factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus 
motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, 
shrewd, prudent, or competent,” and explaining that a 
plaintiff must instead produce sufficient evidence to permit a 
reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer did not 
actually act for the asserted non-discriminatory reason).  
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explanation for why Capps was discharged – its honest belief 
that Capps misused his FMLA leave and was otherwise 
dishonest in violation of Mondelez’s policies.  Following 
Capps’ AVN diagnosis in 2002 and his bilateral hip 
replacements in 2004, Capps was continuously recertified for 
FMLA leave during his tenure at Mondelez approximately 
every six months through early 2014.  There is no indication 
that any of Capps’ requests for FMLA leave were denied or 
that he was prohibited from returning to work after taking his 
approved FMLA leave.  Indeed, Capps returned to the same 
position with the same benefits each time he returned from 
taking his leave, and he continued to take intermittent FMLA 
leave without issue through the remainder of 2013.  
Moreover, there is no indication of any animus on the part of 
Mondelez related to Capps taking FMLA leave prior to 
receiving notice of Capps’ arrest and conviction.   
 
 It was not until Oxenford received the newspaper 
article in 2014 alerting him to Capps’ DUI arrest and 
conviction, that Oxenford began to investigate Capps’ 
attendance record to determine if any of his FMLA leave 
coincided with the dates related to his arrest and conviction.  
Further, the undisputed evidence indicates that when 
Oxenford and McAvoy reviewed the criminal court docket 
related to Capps’ DUI case, the docket reflected that the arrest 
date and “court dates” appeared to coincide with days on 
which Capps had taken FMLA leave.  Although Capps argues 
that Mondelez was mistaken in its belief that Capps misused 
his leave or was otherwise dishonest with regard to the leave 
taken, there is a lack of evidence indicating that Mondelez did 
not honestly hold that belief.  Accordingly, in light of 
insufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude 
that Mondelez’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for 
terminating Capps’ employment was a pretext, the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment on Capps’ FMLA 
retaliation claim.  See McCoy, 957 F.2d at 373 (“[T]he issue 
of pretext does not address the correctness or desirability of 
reasons offered for employment decisions.  Rather, it 
addresses the issue of whether the employer honestly believes 
in the reasons it offers.”).   
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  (B)  FMLA Interference Claim 
 To make a claim of interference under the FMLA, a 
plaintiff must establish: 
 
(1) he or she was an eligible 
employee under the FMLA; (2) 
the defendant was an employer 
subject to the FMLA’s 
requirements; (3) the plaintiff was 
entitled to FMLA leave; (4) the 
plaintiff gave notice to the 
defendant of his or her intention 
to take FMLA leave; and (5) the 
plaintiff was denied benefits to 
which he or she was entitled 
under the FMLA. 
 
Ross, 755 F.3d at 191-92 (citation omitted); see also Sommer 
v. Vanguard Grp., 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(observing that an interference claim requires an employee to 
show that he was not only entitled to FMLA benefits but also 
that he was denied those benefits).  Unlike an FMLA 
retaliation claim, “[a]n interference action is not about 
discrimination, it is only about whether the employer 
provided the employee with the entitlements guaranteed by 
the FMLA.”  Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2005); see Scruggs, 688 F.3d at 825 (quoting Shaffer v. 
Am. Med. Ass’n, 662 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2011)) (“An 
[FMLA] interference claim does not require an employee to 
prove discriminatory intent on the part of the employer; 
rather, such a claim ‘requires only proof that the employer 
denied the employee his or her entitlements under the 
Act.’”).10  Accordingly, “[b]ecause [an FMLA interference 
action] is not about discrimination, a McDonnell-Douglas 
                                              
10 Capps’ brief acknowledges this requirement.  See Appellant 
Br. 18 (citing Callison, 430 F.3d at 119) (“In order to state a 
claim for interference under the FMLA, a plaintiff must show 
that the plaintiff was denied benefits to which he or she was 
entitled under the Act.”).   
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burden-shifting analysis is not required.”  Sommer, 461 F.3d 
at 399.   
 
 Here, the District Court found that Capps’ FMLA 
interference claim failed because Capps was unable to satisfy 
the fifth requirement – that he was denied a benefit to which 
he was entitled under the FMLA.  See Capps, 147 F. Supp.3d 
at 335.  In support of its decision, the District Court cited 
Ross, where we found that “[b]ecause [the employee] 
received all of the benefits to which he was entitled by taking 
leave and then being reinstated to the same position from 
which he left, and thus cannot satisfy the fifth prong of the 
interference analysis, he fails to make a prima facie showing 
of interference.”  See Ross, 755 F.3d at 192.  Capps returned 
from his FMLA leave, including the February 14 and 15, 
2013 FMLA leave, to the same position and same benefits.  
(JA 13, 48-49.)      
 
 Capps argues that his termination amounted to a 
deprivation of benefits and therefore interference under the 
FMLA.  “[W]e have made it plain that, for an interference 
claim to be viable, the plaintiff must show that FMLA 
benefits were actually withheld.”  See Ross, 755 F.3d at 192 
(citing Callison, 430 F.3d at 119).  Here, Capps is unable to 
show that.  Under the specific circumstances in this case, 
since he is unable to point to evidence in the record indicating 
that he was denied a benefit to which he was entitled under 
the FMLA, Mondelez was entitled to summary judgment on 
the FMLA interference claim.11       
                                              
11 Capps points to Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 
500 (3d Cir. 2009), in support of the contention that the facts 
in this case constitute both FMLA retaliation and interference 
claims.  Id. at 509 (holding that firing an employee for a valid 
FMLA leave request may constitute interference with the 
employee’s FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the 
employee).  However, Erdman is distinguishable from this 
case.  In Erdman, the employee “requested FMLA leave but 
was fired before the leave was scheduled to begin,” i.e., 
before the employee actually took the leave.  Id.  Unlike 
Capps’ case, the issue in Erdman was whether an employee 
must take FMLA leave to prove a retaliation claim where the 
employee requested FMLA leave but was fired before 
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IV.    ADA CLAIM 
 Finally, Capps claimed in the District Court that 
Mondelez failed to accommodate his disability as required 
under the ADA.12  See Capps, 147 F. Supp.3d at 340.  The 
District Court found that this claim “fails as a matter of law 
because Capps never made a request for an accommodation.”  
Id.    
 
 On appeal, Capps devotes only one paragraph to his 
ADA failure-to-accommodate claim.  Specifically, he argues 
that “[r]equests for intermittent leave may be protected by the 
ADA” and that a request for FMLA leave does not bar an 
ADA retaliation claim.  See Appellant Br. 29-30 (emphasis 
added).13   
                                                                                                     
actually using the leave.  Id. at 508.  It is not surprising that 
such facts may constitute an interference claim and a 
retaliation claim since the employee was fired before 
receiving the benefit of actually taking the leave or being 
reinstated to the same position following the leave.  Here, of 
course, Capps requested the FMLA leave in question, that 
request was approved, Capps took the leave in question, and 
Capps was reinstated to the same or equivalent position after 
taking the approved leave.  
        
12 Capps also included in his Second Amended Complaint 
claims for retaliation and discrimination under the ADA, but 
he does not specifically pursue those claims in his appellate 
brief.  In any event, as with Capps’ FMLA retaliation claim, 
the McDonnell Douglas framework applies, and his ADA 
retaliation and discrimination claims fail for the same reason 
– a lack of evidence that Mondelez’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for firing Capps was a pretext.  See, 
e.g., Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1003-04, 1007 (applying the 
honest belief rule to an ADA claim).     
 
13 While the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), as amicus curiae, takes no position on the ultimate 
disposition of this case, see EEOC Br. 2 n.1, the EEOC 
requests that this Court hold that a request for leave under 
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 Mondelez responds that “Capps’ one-paragraph 
placeholder [in his brief] should be construed as a waiver of 
any argument related to the ADA.”  See Appellee Br. 27.  
Furthermore, Mondelez contends that the District Court 
properly concluded that Capps’ request for FMLA leave, 
standing alone, could not serve as an accommodation under 
the ADA.  It is unnecessary to address whether Capps waived 
his ADA claim on appeal, since, even assuming the claim was 
not waived, it is clearly without merit.   
 
 We recognize that a request for FMLA leave may 
qualify, under certain circumstances, as a request for a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see 29 C.F.R. § 
825.702(c)(2), and to the extent that the District Court held 
otherwise, that was error.  However, in this case, even 
assuming that Capps had a disability as defined by the ADA, 
that Capps was a qualified individual under the ADA, and 
that Capps’ request for intermittent FMLA leave also 
constituted a request for a reasonable accommodation under 
the ADA, the record does not support a view that Mondelez 
discriminated against Capps under the ADA or refused to 
accommodate any such request. 
 
 A plaintiff bringing an ADA failure-to-accommodate 
claim must establish: “(1) he was disabled and his employer 
knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) 
his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and 
(4) he could have been reasonably accommodated.”  
Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 
246 (3d Cir. 2006);14 see Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 
495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Phila. Housing 
Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Here, 
even assuming, arguendo, that Capps’ requests for 
                                                                                                     
both the FMLA and the ADA is not inherently contradictory, 
id. at 21-22.   
 
14 Although Armstrong involved a claim under the N.J. Law 
Against Discrimination (“LAD”), “[t]he requirements for 
failure to accommodate claims under New Jersey’s LAD have 
been interpreted in accordance with the [ADA].”  Armstrong, 
438 F.3d at 246 n.12. 
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intermittent FMLA leave constituted requests for a reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA as well, Mondelez continued 
to approve Capps’ requested leave, and indeed, Capps took 
the requested leave.  Thus, Mondelez provided and Capps 
received the accommodation he asked for.  There is clearly a 
lack of evidence to show that Mondelez did not make a good 
faith effort in accommodating Capps’ request for intermittent 
leave.  Since the record here does not support any failure to 
accommodate Capps, we affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on Capps’ failure-to-accommodate claim 
under the ADA.  See Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space 
Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that we 
may affirm a judgment on any ground apparent from the 
record, even if the District Court did not reach it).              
        
IV.    CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court’s Order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Mondelez.  
 
 
